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The Concept of Legislative Power in
Louisiana Constitutions
Kimbrough Owen*
The introduction to this symposium points out the significance of the concept of legislative power for any constitutional
convention in this state. To what extent should the legislature
be trusted? To what extent should a constitutional convention
provide not only the basic structure and principles of government for the state but also the implementation in lengthy constitutional provisions? The answer to these questions will determine whether the next constitution will be shorter than the
present one, and it may also determine the ext~nt to which the
voters are to be relieved of the biennial deluge of constitutional
amendments which they now experience.
The purpose of this article is to trace briefly the basic attitude of the Louisiana courts toward the legislature under Louisiana's ten constitutions, to present the four principal types of
limitations imposed by Louisiana constitutional conventions on
the legislature, and to consider the effect on legislative power
of the 302 amendments that have been added to the present
Constitution. Finally, an attempt is made to deal briefly with
the outlook for legislative power in the next convention.

I
THE LOUISIANA COURTS AND LEGISLATIVE POWER

Under the American federal system, as Dr. Graves points
out, the state legislature is a repository of the residual powers
of the people: "Unless restricted by provisions in the state constitution, [it] can act with regard to any subject that has not been
delegated to the national government or expressly or impliedly
denied to the states under the terms of the Federal Constitution."'
* Associate Professor of Government, Louisiana State University.
1. See Graves, page 749 supra. It does not appear that the United States
Supreme Court has been greatly impressed by the doctrine of residual
power of state legislatures, even though the attitude of Mr. Justice Chase in
Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (U.S. 1798), has not been maintained. In this case
[764]
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This doctrine is of basic importance for an understanding not
only of the constitutional framework in which the power of the
legislature must be discussed, but also for an understanding of
a practical problem confronting a constitutional convention. As
long as the doctrine of residual power is maintained by the courts,
a convention need not fear that the deletion of authorizations
and mandates in the present Constitution would raise doubts as
to the power of the legislature under a new constitution. It is
significant, therefore, that the Louisiana courts have consistently
maintained this doctrine.
the Justice, speaking for the Court, could not subscribe "to the omnipotence
of a State Legislature, or that it is absolute and without controul; although
Its authority should not be expressly restrained by the Constitution, or fundamental law, of the State." Id. at 387. He saw no distinction between the
federal and state legislatures in this respect. "To maintain that our Federal,
or State, Legislature possesses such powers, if they had not been expressly
restrained; would, in my opinion, be a political heresy, altogether inadmissible in our free republican governments." Id. at 388. In Fletcher v. Peck, 6
Cranch 87 (U.S. 1810) the Court declared that "the legislature of Georgia,
unless restrained by its own constitution" had the power to dispose of its
unappropriated lands, but an act divesting the owner of his property by
annulling a grant was not a legitimate exercise of the legislative power. Id. at
128, 139. The Court again referred to the limitations imposed on the legislative power by the nature of society and government. Mr. Justice Storey in
his dissent in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Peters 420 (U.S.
1837), contended that the legislature is not the sovereign of the state, but
possesses only those attributes of sovereignty delegated to it by the people
who are the real sovereign. Yet since the power to grant franchises was
among the powers so delegated and was not limited by any restrictive terms
in the Constitution, the grant was then general and unlimited as to the
terms, manner and extent of granting franchises. In Butler v. Pennsylvania,
10 How. 402 (U.S. 1850), the Court upheld an act of the Pennsylvania legislaSture reducing the per diem of certain public officers against the charge that
it represented a violation of contract. The Court upheld the act since there
was no restriction in the Constitution of Pennsylvania on the discretion of
the legislature in the augmentation or diminution of salaries. Mr. Justice
Field in Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888), upheld an act of the legislative
assembly of the territory of Oregon granting a divorce but was unwilling to
base it completely on the residual theory of state legislative power. "[T]he
legislative department," he commented, "when not restrained by constitutional provisions and a regard for certain fundamental rights of the citizen
which are recognized in this country as the basis of all government, has acted
upon everything within the range of civil government." (Italics supplied.)
Id. at 205. In the absence of a direct prohibition, he concluded that the right
of divorce remained with the legislature. Chief Justice Fuller perhaps came
closest to the statement of the theory of the residual powers of the state
legislature in upholding the validity of a Texas statute requiring a license
for the sale of liquor, one of the conditions of which was an agreement not
to sell to parties when so requested through the sheriff by the wife, mother,
daughter, or sister of such person. Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U.S. 657 (1893).
The Chief Justice declared, "Irrespective of the operation of the Federal
Constitution and restrictions asserted to be inherent in the nature of American institutions, the general rule is that*there are no limitations upon the
legislative power of the legislature of a state except those imposed by its
written constitution." Id. at 661.
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In 1826 the Supreme Court of Louisiana in LeBreton v. Morgan 2 upheld a special state tax on the Parish of Orleans to pay
for the expense of repairing a crevasse in that parish. The Constitution of 1812 was silent on the subject of taxation. The court
based its opinion on the proposition that the state constitution
constituted not a grant of power to the legislature but rather a
limitation of its power. The court declared: "The constitution
of this state having affixed no limits to the exercise of the power
of taxation by the legislature, it is difficult to suppose even a
case, in which the exercise of that power could be considered
unconstitutional, or properly become the subject of judicial
interference. The only objections that can be made to acts raising revenue is their inexpediency, or injustice, and both these
are exclusively for the consideration of those with whom the
constitution has deposited this power .... -" The legislature "had
the same right to order it to be paid by a tax on the parish of
New Orleans, as they had to levy it off the whole state; for there
is nothing in the constitution which declares that taxation must
be uniform ....
All these powers are by the constitution exclu4'
sively and wisely, confided to the representatives of the people.
In 1845 the court provided another statement of the residual
power of the legislature in Bozant v. Campbell.5 The court upheld
the power of a municipality to grant an exception to an ordinance
prohibiting the establishment of a private hospital within the
city limits. When the plaintiff argued that neither the legislature
nor its creature the city council had such an authority, that even
Congress did not have such power, the court commented: "It is
useless to inquire into the powers of Congress in this respect;
for those of the State legislature exceed, in many cases those of
Congress, that body having no power to do any thing which the
federal contitution does not authorize, while the State legislatures
may do whatever is not prohibited by their respective constitu6
tions."
The court then cited examples of private legislative acts discharging insolvent debtors from imprisonment, authorizing an
uncle to marry his niece, and exempting individuals or private
2. 4 Mart.(N.S.) 138 (La. 1826).
3. Id. at 142.

4. Id. at 143-44.
5. 9 Rob. 411 (La. 1845).

See also In re New Orleans Draining Company,

11 La. Ann. 338 (1856).

6. 9 Rob. 411, 413 (La. 1845).
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corporations from the general law prohibiting lotteries. The
court did not disapprove, for it did not consider that government
was "instituted to attend to the concerns of the community
alone, but to those of individuals also."7
In 1868 the court cited the residual legislative power in two
cases involving changes made in the provision of the Constitution
of 1852 by the Constitutions of 1864 and 1868. In the first of these
cases, State v. Volkman,8 the constitutionality of a license tax
was challenged as not being equal and uniform or levied pro
rata upon the amount of income or business done. Article 123 of
the Constitution of 1852 read: "[T]he Legislature shall have
power to levy an income-tax, and to tax all persons pursuing any
occupation, trade or profession." This language was changed in
the Constitutions of 1864 and 1868 to read: "The general assembly
shall levy an income tax upon all persons pursuing any occupation, trade, or calling, and all such persons shall obtain a license,
as provided by law. All tax on income shall be pro rata on the
amount of income or business done."9
It was argued that the pro rata requirement had been added
to prevent the injustice of charging the same license fee on small
and large traders. The court disagreed and found the act a valid
exercise of legislative power, since there was no prohibition in
the constitution.
The second case, New Orleans v. Lusse, 10 involved the addition of a provision to the Constitution of 1864 authorizing the
legislature to exempt from taxation property actually used for
church, school, or charitable purposes." The question raised in
this case was whether the legislature was thereby prohibited
from exempting persons engaged in selling articles of their own
manufacture, manufactured within the state1 2 from municipal
7. Id. at 414. The doctrine of residual power was used in 1857 to uphold
the power of the legislature to confer such a part of its power upon the
mayor and aldermen and police jurors as might be "suited to their immediate

needs" in Hunsicker v. Briscoe, 12 La. Ann. 169 (1857). The doctrine received
a slightly different statement in this case. "The State of Louisiana being
sovereign, it must follow that the General Assembly, in all that concerns the
law giving power, is supreme, except in those particulars in which it is
expressly restrained by the Constitution." Id. at 169. See also Avery v.
Police Jury, 12 La. Ann. 554 (1857), in which the court emphasized that the
legislature was supreme in its sphere.
8. 20 La. Ann. 585 (1868).
9. LA. CONST. Art. 124 (1864); LA. CONST.Art. 118 (1868).
10. 21 La. Ann. 1 (1869).
11. LA. CONST. Art. 124 (1864),

12. 21 La. Ann. 1, 2 (1869).

See also Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilots
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taxation. The court decided that the authorization was not an
implied prohibition. "Such a power not being prohibited, ex13
pressly or by necessary implication, is permitted."
Almost fifty years after the first statement of residual legislative power in LeBreton v. Morgan the court gave the doctrine
its fullest development in the Slaughterhouse case, State v.
Fagan,1 4 in 1870. The court upheld in this case the constitutionality of an act incorporating and conferring exclusive privileges
upon the Crescent City Live Stock Landing and Slaughterhouse
Company.' 5 Citing Cooley's ConstitutionalLimitations, the court
explained:
"The accepted theory seems to be this: In every sovereign State there resides an absolute and uncontrolled power
of legislation. In Great Britain this complete power rests in
the Parliament; in the American States, it resides in the
people themselves, as an organized body politic. But the
people, by creating the constitution of the United States,
have delegated this power, as to certain subjects, and under
certain restrictions, to the Congress of the United States,
and that portion they cannot resume, except as it may be
done through amendment of the national constitution.
"For the exercise of the legislative power, subject to this
limitation, they create, by their State constitution, a legislative department, upon which they confer it; and, granting
it in general terms, they must be understood to grant the
whole legislative power which they possessed, except so far
as at the same time they saw fit to impose restrictions."'
Chancellor Kent was also cited to the effect that, although
the theory of the omnipotence of Parliament did not prevail in
the United States, "if there be no constitutional objection to a
statute, it is with us, as absolute and uncontrollable as laws flowing from the sovereign power under any other form of govern7
ment."1
for Port of New Orleans, 209 La. 737, 25 So.2d 527 (1946). "[W]ithin the limits
stated by the Constitution, Federal and State, the Legislature is free to determine what subjects are proper to be legislated upon in the conservation of
order, morals, health and safety." 209 La. 737, 749, 25 So.2d 527, 531 (1946).

13. 21 La. Ann. 1, 2 (1869).
14. 22 La. Ann. 545 (1870), afl'd 16 Wall. 36 (U.S. 1872).
15. La. Acts 1869, No. 118, p. 170.

16. 22 La. Ann. 545, 550 (1870).
17. State v. Fagan, 22 La. Ann. 545, 550 (1870). See also Hughes v.
Murdock, 45 La. Ann. 935, 13 So. 182 (1893): "The legislature of a state, unlike
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Since 1900 a series of cases have been decided in which legilative action has been upheld on the basis of the recognition of
the legislature's residual power. These cases have involved the
control of the legislature over local government 8 and judicial
procedures,' 9 the legislature's authority to enact civil service
legislation, 20 and other questions of legislative power. In all
these cases the decisions emphasized that the constitution was
not a grant but a limitation on legislative power and that the
legislature might, therefore, enact any law not prohibited by the
constitution of the state or nation.
Congress, which cannot do anything which the Federal Constitution does not
authorize, may do everything which the State Constitution doer not prohibit,
and constitutional prohibitions are not enlarged by construction beyond their
terms."
In 1893 the doctrine was again employed in upholding legislative action.
The Constitutions of 1864 and 1868 had added a prohibition against the adoption of children by special legislation. The court in Hughes v. Murdock
ruled that this prohibition did not prevent legitimation by such an act. 45
La. Ann. 935, 13 So. 182 (1893).
18. Pyle v. Shreveport, 215 La. 257, 40 So.2d 235 (1949); Edwards v. Town
of Ponchatoula, 213 La. 116, 34 So.2d 394 (1948); Mulhaupt v. Shreveport, 126
La. 780, 52 So. 1023 (1910); Ascension Red Cypress Co. v. New River Drainage District, 175 La. 300, 143 So. 270 (1932); Stovall v. City of Monroe,
199 La. 195, 5 So.2d 547 (1941); and State v. Cusimano, 187 La. 269, 174 So. 352
(1937). In this last case the court referred to the doctrine of residual power
as "fundamental." 187 La. 269, 277, 174 So. 352, 355 (1937).
19. Walker v. Superior Brass and Copper Foundry Co., 152 La. 626, 94 So.
139 (1922); and State v. Toon, 172 La. 631, 135 So. 7 (1931). In the Toon case,
the court observed: "[The legislature] has the power to enact such legislation as is not prohibited by the Constitution of the United States or of the
Constitution of the State." 172 La. 631, 639, 135 So. 7, 10 (1931). In the Walker
case, the court referred to "the familiar principle that a legislature may
enact any legislation not prohibited by the Constitution of the state, or by
that of the United States." 152 La. 626, 629, 94 So. 139, 140 (1922).
In State v. Sharp, 174 La. 860, 141 So. 859 (1932), the contention that
Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution of 1921, guaranteeing the right of
the accused to challenge jurors peremptorily, precluded the legislature from
granting that right to the state was "answered by the mere statement that
all legislative authority of the state that is not denied to the Legislature by
the Constitution resides in that body." 174 La. 860, 864, 141 So. 859, 860 (1932).
20. In upholding the Fire and Police Civil Service Act of 1934 [La. Acts
1934 (2 E.S.), No. 22, p. 113] in Ward v. Leche, 189 La. 113, 179 So. 52 (1938),
the court cited the "recognized principle of constitutional law that except
where limitations have been imposed by the federal and state constitution
the power of the legislature is unlimited and practically absolute. . . . As a
rule, therefore, and speaking generally a legislature may do what the state or
federal constitution does not prohibit." 189 La. 113, 120, 179 So. 52, 54 (1938).
When the 1940 act proposing a constitutional amendment on civil service
was challenged in Ricks v. Department of State Civil Service, 200 La. 341,
8 So.2d 49 (1942), the court would not consider it for the reason that the
Constitution contained no restriction in this respect and cited the "familiar
doctrine, that the Legislature of a State, unlike Congress, which cannot do
anything which the Federal Constitution does not authorize, may do everything which the State Constitution does not prohibit." 200 La. 341, 382, 8 So.2d
49, 62 (1942).
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Two characteristic statements of the doctrine under the
Constitution of 1921 may be seen in the following cases. Upholding the Criminal Code of 1942 in State v. Pete21 the court declared
somewhat impatiently: "It is elementary that state Constitutions
are not grants of power to their respective legislative bodies but,
rather, limitations of their general powers. Consequently, our
Legislature may enact any law that is not expressly or inferentially prohibited by the Constitution of this state or of the United
22
States.
The doctrine of residual power was referred to as "fundamental law" in State ex rel. Porterie v. Charity Hospital.23 This
case construed certain important limitations in the Constitution
of 1921 in such a way as to favor the exercise of legislative power.
The legislature might dedicate revenues without violating the
prohibition of making an appropriation for longer than two
years. 24 Although the state could not incur debt except for certain emergencies the legislature might authorize state agencies
to do So.25 Although the state's revenues could not be pledged
for hospital bonds, 26 the legislature might authorize one of its
2
agencies to pledge its revenues for the payment of such bonds. T
Residual legislative power referred to as "the familiar principle," the "recognized principle," the "familiar doctrine," the
"fundamental law," the "mere statement" of which was sufficient
has been maintained by the courts sympathetically through ten
Louisiana constitutions. A 1950 case, Tanner v. Beverly Country
Club,28 indicates, however, the difficulties which the doctrine is
beginning to experience under the present Constitution. The
case involved the constitutionality of Act 192 of 1920 as amended
21. 206 La. 1078, 20 So.2d 368 (1944). See also Conley v. City of Shreveport, 216 La. 78, 43 So.2d 223 (1949).
22. 206 La. 1078, 1085, 20 So.2d 368, 371 (1944). In Crain v. State, 23 So.2d
336 (La. App. 1945), a private act authorizing suit against the state in a
workmen's compensation case where the general law would have applied
was upheld by reference to this doctrine.
23. 182 La. 268, 161 So. 606 (1935).
24. LA. CoNST. Art. IV, § 1 (1921).
25. LA. CONST. Art. IV, § 2 (1921).
26. LA. CONST. Art. IV,

§§

2, 12 (1921).

27. In State v. Grosjean, 182 La. 298, 161 So. 871 (1935), the inherent power
of the legislature was employed to uphold an act authorizing the Governor
to suspend the provisions of a statute levying a petroleum refining occupational tax of five cents a barrel by placing the tax at one cent a barrel. The
court construed the act as not violating the prohibition against delegating the
taxing power or suspending the laws.
28. 217 La. 1043, 47 So.2d 905 (1950).
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in 1938 and 1940.29 The 1920 act, passed in pursuance of the provision of the 1913 Constitution that gambling was a vice and that
the legislature should pass laws to suppress it, authorized any
taxpayer to file suit in any district court to abate the nuisance
of gambling establishments. The 1938 amendment required a
petition of twenty-five real estate taxpayers and specified that
the petition should be filed in the district court "having jurisdiction thereof." The 1940 amendment changed the requirement
to ten taxpayers and deleted the phrase "having jurisdiction
thereof." Chief Justice Fournet, speaking for the majority, declared the act unconstitutional as extending the territorial jurisdiction of the district courts in violation of Article VII which
divides the state into judicial districts and fixes the territorial
limits of each district. From the view of legislative power the
significance of the case may lie in the reliance placed by the court
upon legislative mandates. The court considered that the mandate to the legislature in Section 38 of Article VII to provide for
the trial of recused cases and in Section 45 to provide for change
of venue in civil and criminal cases was an implied prohibition
against changing the territorial jurisdiction of the courts in any
30
other cases. Black's Handbook of American Constitutional Law
was quoted with approval to the effect that "A limitation upon
the legislative power may be by direct prohibition or by implication, and in the latter case its restraints on the legislature are no
less binding than when expressly prohibited. To create an implied
prohibition there must be some express affirmative provision
....

"31

The Chief Justice then quoted from Cooley's Treatise on

Constitutional Limitations32 the New York court's decision in
People v. Draper,33 ". . . the affirmative prescriptions and the
general arrangements of the constitution are far more fruitful
of restraints upon the legislature. Every positive direction contains an implication against anything contrary to it. .. Justice McCaleb dissenting in part did not consider the act
a violation of the Constitution. It appeared to him that "a contrary inference exists-i.e., an inference in recognition of such
legislative power-in view of Section 9 of Article 1 of the Consti29. La. Acts 1938, No. 49, p. 162-63; La. Acts 1940, No. 120, p. 499-500.
30. BLACK, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 343 (4th ed. 1927).
31. 217 La. 1043, 1066, 47 So.2d 905, 912 (1950).
32. 1 COOLEY, TREATISE ON

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 176, n. 4 (8th ed.

1927).
33. 24 Barb. 265 (N.Y. 1857).
34. 217 La. 1043, 1066, 47 So.2d 905, 913 (1950).
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tution which specially fixes the venue of criminal trials in the
parish in which the offense was committed-for, if the framers of
the organic law did not intend to give the Legislature a free hand
to determine venue in all civil cases, it would seem that they
would have included a provision similar to that obtaining in
criminal trials. '3 5 He concluded that the matter rested "entirely
within the control of the Legislature unhampered in its power
by constitutional limitations."36
The legislature's residual power to exercise any power not
prohibited by the Constitution was not denied. The case does
indicate, however, that the growing number of mandates, prohibitions, and other limitations in the Constitution may eventually make the doctrine irrelevant and that the uncertainty caused
as to the power of the legislature may well lead legislators and
political leaders to demand that even more in the way of legislative powers be included in the Constitution.
From this survey it would appear that in spite of the possible implications of the Tanner case the doctrine of residual
legislative power seems sufficiently well established in Louisiana
so that a future convention should be able to delete from the
new document material in the old Constitution without the fear
that the courts would construe such action as a denial of such
power to the legislature.8 7
II
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS AND LEGISLATIVE POWER
The framers of Louisiana's ten constitutions have evidently
been in full agreement with the courts that the powers of the
legislature were limited by the constitution and not granted by it.
They have considered it a primary purpose of the constitution
to provide effective limits to the possible abuses of legislative
5s
power
The extent and variety of the limitations that have developed in Louisiana's constitutional history may be shown by
35. 217 La. 1043, 1073, 47 So.2d 905, 915 (1950).
36. 217 La. 1043, 1074, 47 So.2d 905, 915 (1950).
37. For a discussion of the importance of this problem In the drafting of
a constitution, see Saye, The Extent of State Legislative Power, 12 GA. B.J.
147 (1949).
38. See Powell, A History of Louisiana's Constitutions, in 1 PROJET FOR A

NEW CONSTITUTION (Louisiana State Law Institute, to be published in Aug.,
1954).
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contrasting and comparing the Constitution of 1812 with that of
1921. The Constitution of 1812 was the first of Louisiana's ten
constitutions and the shortest. It represented the least restraint
on legislative power. The Constitution of 1921 has grown to be
by far the longest constitution, not only in comparison with previous Louisiana constitutions but in comparison with the constitutions of other states. It imposes far more limitations on legislative power than did the Constitution of 1812.39 From Dr. Graves'
discussion in the preceding article 40 it would appear that Louisiana's constitutional development has been similar to that of
other states, differing only in the extent and variety of the limitations.
Four types of limitations on legislative power are represented
by the Constitution of 1921: (1) limitations on legislative sessions
and procedures, (2) substantive prohibitions of legislative action,
(3) mandates to the legislature, and (4) the inclusion of statutory
material in the Constitution.
(1) Limitations on Sessions and Procedures'
The Constitution of 1812 provided for a bicameral legislature
meeting on the first Monday in January every year "unless a
different day be appointed by law. '41 Sessions were unlimited as
to length. The requirements for the passage of bills and other
legislative procedures filled less than two pages. The Constitution of 1921 provides for a limited session of sixty days every
other year. Requirements of legislative procedures fill nine
pages in the Constitution.4 2 The biennial session of sixty days was
first adopted by the constitutional convention of 1845 as an
economy measure. The convention considered sixty days ample
if the legislators refrained from local legislation. 48 The annual
session was restored by the Convention of 1852 and remained
until the Convention of 187944 provided for a sixty day biennial
39. BOOK OF THE STATES (Council of State Governments, 1954); PUBLIC
AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL LEGISLATIVE BULLETIN No. 6 (June 21, 1952); LoUISIANA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION IN LOUISIANA: AN ANALYSIS

(1954).
40. See page 751 supra.
41. LA. CONST. Art. II, §§ 1, 3 (1812).
42. LA. CONST. Art. III, § 8 (1921). All references are to the Constitution
as adopted on June 18, 1921, and therefore without amendments.
43. LA. CONST. Art. 5 (1845); Powell, A History of Louisiana's Constitutions c. 2, in 1 PROJET FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION (Louisiana State Law Institute,
to be published in Aug., 1954).
44. LA. CONST. Art. 21 (1879). See LA. CONST. Art. 5 (1852); LA. CONST. Art.
7 (1864); LA. CONST. Art. 17 (1868).
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session as one attempt to prevent a recurrence of the abuses of a
carpetbag legislature.
The importance of this limitation on the legislature has
become more significant with the ever increasing work load of
the legislature. In 1879 the legislature had 562 bills to consider.
45
By 1952 the number of bills had increased to 1654.
A second major limitation on legislative action is found in
the provision for special sessions; here too the distrust of the
legislature that has developed over the century and a quarter of
Louisiana constitutional development is apparent. The Convention of 1812 authorized the Governor to call sessions of the legislature on "extraordinary occasions. '46 In 1879 a limitation was
added that restricted the legislature to a consideration of the
objects enumerated in the call and to the time specified in the
call. 47 This limitation was continued by the Constitution of 1921.48
The limitation on the frequency and duration of regular
sessions has encouraged the use of special sessions. There have
been more special sessions than regular sessions under the 1921
Constitution. 49 Since the Governor controls the selection of items
to be considered and the length of the session, the frequent use
of special sessions represents a significant limitation on legislative power.
A third major limitation on the legislature in this area concerns the veto power of the Governor. The Governor's veto power
in the 1921 Constitution is substantially the same as it was in
1812, except for power to veto items of the appropriation bill
which was added by the Constitution of 1879 and carried over into
subsequent constitutions."0 In 1812, however, there was no limi45. The Legislative Process in Louisiana, LOUISIANA LEGISLATIVE

COUNCIL

RESEARCH STUDY No. 1, p. 3 (1953).

46. LA. CONST. Art. III, § 14 (1812).
47. LA. CONST. Art. 72 (1879).
48. LA. CONST. Art. V, § 14 (1921). The Constitution of 1921 did add the
authorization to the legislature to call a special session by a petition of twothirds of the members elected. No special session has been called in such
manner.
49. There have been 24 special sessions and 16 regular sessions since 1921.

For an extensive discussion of the practice and abuses of special sessions,
see Special Session of July 6-17, 1953: An Analysis of the Problem, PUBLIC
AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF LA. No. 9 (Oct. 30, 1953); The Legislative Process
in

Louisiana,

LOUISIANA

LEGISLATIVE

COUNCIL

RESEARCH

STUDY

NO.

1,

p.

11

(Feb., 1953).
50. LA. CONST. Art. V, § 15 (1921); LA. CONST. Art. III, § 20 (1812). The
1812 Constitution provided that if the Governor did not return a bill within
ten days, it should become law without his signature; if the general assembly
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tation on the length of the session. The veto provision combined
with the sixty-day session mean in practice that the Governor's
veto will not be overridden. The pressure on the legislature,
because of the constantly increasing work load, has however
made this limitation of far greater significance in 1950 even
than it was in 1921. The Louisiana Governor has vetoed 808 bills
since 1921.51 Of these only fifty were vetoed before the final
adjournment of the legislature. The legislature has never over52
ridden a Governor's veto under the 1921 Constitution.
In view of the obvious dissatisfaction with the legislature
entertained by constitutional conventions in Louisiana it is
strange that the conventions have done so little to strengthen
the legislative process. Since 1879 the only significant positive
approach by a convention to securing better legislation would
seem to be the provision of a thirty-day time limit for the introduction of bills. 52
The approach of Louisiana conventions has been characterized by the imposition of limitations on the legislature rather
54
than by serious attempts to improve the legislative process.
prevented its return by adjournment it should become law "unless sent back
within three days after their next meeting." LA. CONST. Art. V, § 16 (1921);
LA. CONST. Art. 77 (1898, 1913).
51. The Legislative Process in Louisiana, LOUISIANA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
RESEARCH STUDY No. 1, p. 22 (Feb., 1953). It is interesting to note that the
Governor of Louisiana has exercised the veto power more frequently than
the governor of any other Southern state. See Prescott, The Executive Veto
in the Southern States, 10 J. OF POLITICS 659-75 (1948). See also The Veto
Power in Louisiana, in LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE CONSTITUTION REVISION
PROJECT (unpublished manuscript 1948).
52. The Legislative Process in Louisiana, LOUISIANA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
RESEARCH STUDY NO. 1, p. 22 (Feb., 1953). For figures on the end of the session
rush in the passage of legislation, see The Introduction and Passage of Bills,
in SPECIAL STUDIES, 1 PROJET FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION (Louisiana State Law
Institute, to be published in Aug., 1954).
53. LA. CONST. Art. III, § 8 (1921). This was changed by amendment in
1932 to twenty-one days. La. Acts 1932, No. 145, p. 502. For the operation of
this limitation, see Time Limitations on the Introduction of Bills, in SPECIAL
STUDIES, 1 PROJET FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION

(Louisiana State Law Institute, to

be published in Aug., 1954); and The Legislative Process in Louisiana, LOUISIANA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL RESEARCH STUDY No. 1, p. 42 (Feb., 1953). Less than
2 percent of the bills introduced in the 1952 session were introduced after
the deadline. Rivet, Thoughts on the Legislative Process in Louisiana, 6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 63-69 (1944), commented that the limitation on the introduction of bills was the first attempt in more than a century of statehood to
improve the legislature. The legislative bureau created by the Constitution
of 1921, Article III, § 31, did provide an opportunity to check bills for drafting
errors.
54. This attitude of distrust is reflected in the following comment from
the Times Picayune during the 1921 convention: "Two of the most pernicious
evils connected with the legislature were dealt a blow in two ordinances

introduced . . . [today].

One prohibits members of the Legislature from
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Substantive Prohibitions

The second major type of limitation employed by constitutional conventions in restricting legislative power consists of substantive prohibitions. The increasing development of limitations
becomes apparent in this area also, if the Constitutions of 1812
and 1921 are compared.
Two prohibitions illustrate particularly well the attempt by
constitutional conventions to prevent abuses of legislative power:
the prohibitions against the incurrence of debt and against special legislation."
The Constitution of 1812 contained no prohibition against the
incurrence of debt. The Convention of 1845 authorized the incurrence of debt in case of war, to repel invasions, or to suppress
insurrections. For other purposes, if the debt exceeded $100,000
it required authorization by a special law providing for the ways
and means of paying principal and interest. The law was to be
irrepealable until principal and interest were paid and was not
to be put "into execution until after its enactment by the first
legislature returned by a general election after its passage."' 6
In 1852 the requirement for approval by the subsequent legislature was deleted. 57 An absolute debt limit of twenty-five million
dollars was added as an amendment to the Constitution of 186858
and was reduced by an additional amendment in 187459 to fifteen
million dollars. The Convention of 1898, faced with the debt and
corruption of the reconstruction period, decided to eliminate the
possibility of the legislature's incurring debt. It therefore provided: "The General Assembly shall have no power to contract,
or to authorize the contracting, of any debt or liability, on behalf
of the State; or to issue bonds or other evidence of indebtedness
thereof, except for the purpose of repelling invasion or for the
trading their votes on any measure, the other prohibits the Legislature from
accepting any fee in any measure pending before the law making body."
New Orleans Times Picayune, March 16, 1921, p. 8.
55. Another type of substantive limitation can be seen in the development
of the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights of the 1921 Constitution contains
fifteen sections; the guarantees in only five of these sections were contained
in the Constitution of 1812.
56. LA. CONST. Art. 114 (1845).
57. LA. CONST. Art. 111 (1852). See discussion in Powell, A History of
Louisiana's Constitutions, in 1 PROJET FOR A NEw CONSTITUTION c. 3 (Louisiana
State Law Institute, to be published in Aug., 1954).
58. LA. CONST. Art. 111 (1868), added Nov. 7, 1870.
59. LA. CONST. Art. 162 (1868), amended 1874.
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suppression of insurrection." 60 This prohibition was carried over
into the Constitution of 191361 and adopted by the convention of
1921. 6 2 Thus another important limitation on the power of the
legislature can be traced back to a convention influenced by the
abuses of the reconstruction legislature.
A second illustration of this type of limitation can be seen
in the prohibition against special and local legislation. Here too
the Convention of 1879 has played a determining role. The Constitution of 1812 contained no prohibitions against special and
local legislation, whereas the Constitution of 1921 contains a list
of twenty-one subjects on which the legislature "shall not pass
any local or special law. ' 63 The prohibitions include such subjects
as changing the names of persons; fixing the place of voting;
changing the venue in civil or criminal cases; authorizing the
laying out, opening, closing, altering, or maintaining roads, highways, streets, or alleys, or relating to ferries or bridges; or
authorizing the construction of street passenger railoads in any
incorporated town or city. The entire list of twenty-one subjects
with two slight modifications was taken from the Convention of
1879.64
Before 1879 the constitutions had contained few limitations
against special and local legislation; the Constitutions of 1845 and
1852 had only prohibited divorces by such legislation, 65 and that
of 1864 had added adoption of children, emancipation of minors,
and the changing of names;6 6 that of 1868 had even deleted from
67
the proscribed list of 1864 the changing of names.
The prohibitions directed against a carpetbag legislature by
the Convention of 1879 were carried over in the Constitutions of
1898, 1913, and adopted almost verbatim by the Convention of
1921.68
60. LA. CONST. Art. 46 (1898).
61. LA. CONST. Art. 46 (1913).
62. LA. CONST. Art. IV, § 2 (1921).
63. LA. CONST. Art. IV, § 4 (1921).
64. The prohibition against local legislation exempted New Orleans in
1879; in 1898 the exemption was extended to all corporations having a population of not less than 2500. An amendment in 1916 added river improvement
districts, harbor improvement districts and navigation districts. La. Acts
1915, No. 115, p. 252.
65. LA. CONST. Art. 117 (1845); LA. CONST. Art. 114 (1852).
66. LA. CONST. Art. 117 (1864).
67. LA. CONST. Art. 113 (1868).
68. LA. CONST. Art. 46 (1879); LA. CONST. Art. 48 (1898); LA. CONST. Art. 48
(1913); LA. CONST. Art. IV, § 4 (1921).
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Mandates

A third type of limitation on the legislature devised by constitutional conventions is represented by the mandate, a direction to the legislature to perform an action desired by the
convention. In view of the fact that mandamus will not lie to
compel the legislature to perform a duty under the mandate,
it might be argued that mandates do not constitute limitations
upon the legislature at all.69 Under the theory that "every positive direction contains an implication against anything contrary
70
to it," however, the mandates must be considered seriously.
To constitutional conventions the mandate appears to be
an alternative to long detailed provisions in the constitution. The
failure of the legislature to follow a mandate may become the
justification for the next constitutional convention to include the
detailed provision.
The inclusion of mandates in Louisiana constitutions dates
back to 1812 when the convention in a brief constitution never1
theless included at least nine policy mandates? A comparison of
69. Mandates to the Legislature under the 1921 Constitution, in SPECIAL
1 PROJET FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION (Louisiana State Law Institute, to
be published in Aug., 1954); Arts. 829-844, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1870.
70. Tanner v. Beverly Country Club, 217 La. 1043, 1067, 47 So.2d 905, 913
(1950). See Graves, page 755 supra, for comment on effect of mandate under
the new Missouri Constitution. The court has declared that under the mandate to suppress gambling the "legislature might not license any sort of
gambling," but gambling was a crime only to the extent to which the Legislature had declared it so. State v. Mustachia, 152 La. 821, 824, 94 So. 408, 409
(1922). Yet the court upheld a statute confining wagering on horse racing to
race meeting grounds authorized by the Racing Commission, because under
the mandate the legislature might entirely suppress gambling or it might
provide for the limited licensing of it. State v. Saia, 212 La. 868, 33 So.2d 665
(1948). The mandate may be interpreted to free the legislature from other
restrictions in the Constitution. In Excelsior Planting & Manuf'g Co. v.
Green, 39 La. Ann. 455, 1 So. 873 (1887), the court held that a directive to
establish a levee system removed any legislation enacted thereunder from the
prohibition against special legislation. "We have held in three cases that
where the constitution has in express terms conferred on the general assembly
the duty, or even the power, to adopt legislation on a particular subject, even
though local in character, such duty and power are not subject to the restrictions imposed by article 48 [Constitution of 1879]." 39 La. Ann. 455, 458,
1 So. 873, 876 (1887). The mandate to the legislature to enact all laws necessary "to protect, conserve and replenish the natural resources of the State,
and to prohibit and prevent the waste or any wasteful use thereof" in LA.
CONST. Art. VI, § 1 (1921), was cited in upholding conservation legislation
against the charge of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
Hunter Co. v. McHugh, 202 La. 97, 11 So.2d 495 (1942). Justice Fournet in
dissenting, however, interpreted the mandate as a limitation on legislative
power and considered the legislation invalid because there was no evidence
that the orders of the Commissioner involved in this case were for the prevention of waste.
71. The Constitution of 1812 instructed the legislature to provide for a
STUDIES,
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the 1812 'mandates with those in the Constitution of 1921 indicates not only an increase in number but also the increased scope
of the directives involved. A recent study of the mandates in
the present Constitution lists over seventy. 72 They include such
diverse directives as apportionment; 73 enacting laws to regulate
the employment of convicts; 74 appropriating for the clerical and
other expense of the executive departments;7 5 creating boards of
health; 76 provision for the interest of "State Medicine in all its
departments"; 77 fostering agriculture and immigration and preventing the spread of pests; 78 fixing the duties, compensation, and
powers of the State Bank Commissioner;7 9 provision for hardsurfaced state highways;80 appropriating for the salaries for
stenographers of Supreme Court Justices; 8 ' enacting laws to
secure fairness in party primary elections, conventions, or other
a
methods of naming party candidates;8 2 and appropriating
83
fund.
school
public
state
the
to
minimum amount
Although all of Louisiana's constitutions have contained
mandates, the Constitution of 1879 may be regarded as establishing the pattern for the extensive use of mandates in the Consti84
tution of 1921.
census for apportionment of the legislature (Art. 2, § 6), to provide laws for
filling vacancies in the legislature (Art. 2, § 26), organizing the militia (Art.
3, § 23), excluding certain ineligibles from the suffrage (Art. 6, § 4), providing
for the settlement of differences by arbitrators (Art. 6, § 6), fixing terms of
office of public officers (Art. 6, § 8), providing deductions from salaries of
delinquent public officers (Art. 6, § 10), pointing out the manner in which a
man coming into the country should declare his residence (Art. 6, § 12), and
for directing how persons who were securities for public office might be
relieved or discharged of such securityship (Art. 6, § 16). One of these
mandates, that on arbitration, has been conscientiously repeated in six of
our constitutions and is now a part of the Constitution of 1921. LA. CONST.
Art. 6, § 6 (1812); LA. CONST. Art. 94 (1845); LA. CONST. Art. 95 (1852); LA.
CONST. Art. 97 (1864); LA. CONST. Art. 165 (1879); LA. CONST. Art. 176 (1898);
LA. CONST. Art. 176 (1913); LA. CONST. Art. III, § 36 (1921).
72. A list of these mandates with the action taken by the legislature can
be found in the study, Mandates to the Legislature under the 1921 Constitution, in SPECIAL STUDIES, 1 PROJET FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION (Louisiana State
Law Institute, to be published in Aug., 1954).
73. LA. CONST. Art. III, § 2 (1921).
74. LA. CONST. Art. III, § 33 (1921).
75. LA. CONST. Art. V, § 20 (1921).
76. LA. CONST. Art. VI, § 11 (1921).
77. LA. CONST. Art. VI, § 12 (1921).
78. LA. CONST. Art. VI, § 14 (1921).
79. LA. CONST. Art. VI, § 18 (1921).
80. LA. CONST. Art. VI, § 19 (1921).
81. LA. CONST. Art. VII, § 17 (1921).
82. LA. CONST. Art. VIII, § 4 (1921).
83. LA. CONST. Art. XII, § 14 (1921).
84. For an extensive discussion of the mandates in the Constitution of
1879 see Powell, A History of Louisiana's Constitutions, in 1 PROJET FOR A
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Statutory Material

A fourth type of limitation in Louisiana constitutions is
represented by the inclusion in the constitution of statutory
material. The constitutional convention limits the legislature
when it provides in such detail for the implementation of a basic
policy that no additional action by the legislature is necessary.
The greater the length of the constitution, the greater the indication that it contains statutory material.8 5 The debate as to
what constitutes statutory material and what constitutes constitutional material goes back to the Convention of 1845 and it has
continued in each succeeding constitutional convention. In 1845
the argument concerned the inclusion of provisions for voter
registration in the constitution; one delegate argued that the
legislature would be "fully competent, in the exercise of their
judgment, not only to decree the principle as effectually as it
could be done in the constitution, but to carry out the details.
A change of circumstances may occasion a change of ideas; and
it is for the legislature to be governed by the necessities that
may exist. Our mission here is to establish the fundamental
principles of government; not to decree upon matters of temporary expediency."86
The argument for the inclusion of the provision for voter
registration in the constitution was that the legislature might be
often vacillating and undecided, and that in the thirty-two years
of the legislature's existence it had done nothing on this subject.
In the Convention of 1845 the Democrats wrote into the constitution as much of their party platform as they could. In 1852
the Whigs were in the majority so they wrote in provisions on
public aid for internal improvements and the Democrats urged
that such things be left to the legislature. "Leave it to the legis7
lature" was the partisan cry of the minority in each convention.
A delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1921 expressed
the difficulty with the comment: "It all depends upon what a
(Louisiana State Law Institute, to be published in Aug.,
1954).
85. See in this connection, Powell, ConstitutionalGrowth and Revision in
NEW CONSTITUTION

the South, 10 J. OF POLITICS 354 (1948).

86. Powell, A History of Louisiana's Constitutions c. 2, In 1 PROJET FOR A
NEW CONSTITUTION (Louisiana State Law Institute, to be published in Aug.,
1954).
87. Powell, A History of Louisiana's Constitutions c. 3, in 1 PROJET FOR A
NEW CONSTITUTION (Louisiana State Law Institute, to be published in Aug.,
1954).
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particular member wants and what he opposes. If he is for it,
it becomes fundamental. If he is against it, it becomes legislative."88
Provisions of the 1921 Constitution which may be regarded
as more statutory than fundamental in nature include the salaries
of many public officials which though fixed in the Constitution 9
may be changed by a two-thirds vote of the legislature; the
establishment of administrative officers and boards with qualifications, terms, employees, and powers;90 the appropriation of
funds and the levy of taxes as represented by the establishment
92
of the general highway funds 91 and the public school funds;
the detailed provisions for justices of the peace and constables,
municipal and juvenile courts, sheriffs, clerks, coroners, minor
courts and officials of New Orleans; 93 the application form for
registration;9 4 local government provisions on debt and taxa9 6
tion; 95 and pension provisions.
This type of limitation often represents the desire on the part
of a convention to protect some policy against a desire on the part
of future legislatures for change.
It is characteristic of constitutional conventions and of their
mistrust of the legislature that every constitutional convention
has been concerned with the salaries of at least some public
officers. The Convention of 1812 differed only in degree in this
respect from that of 1921. Two examples of statutory provisions
illustrate this type of limitation on legislative power: the fixing
of salaries and the appropriation of public funds. The Constitution of 1812 fixed only the salaries of Supreme Court judges. The
Constitution of 1921 fixes the salaries of all judicial officers and
of most of the executive and administrative officers referred to
97
in the Constitution.
88. New Orleans Times Picayune, April 27, 1921, p. 6. Cited In Powell, id.
at c. 9.
89. See Table, "Salaries under the 1921 Constitution," in ARTICLE! IV,
2 PROJET FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION (Louisiana State Law Institute, to be published in Aug., 1954); LA. CONST. Art. V, §§ 5, 20 (1921).

90. LA. CONST. Art. VI, §§ 3-9, 16-18 (1921).
91. LA. CONST. Art. VI, § 22 (1921).
92. LA. CONST. Art. XII, § 14 (1921).
93. LA. CONST. Art. VII (1921).
94. LA. CONST. Art. VIII, § 1 (1921).
95. LA. CONST. Art. XIV (1921).
96. LA. CONST. Art. XVIII (1921).

97. See Table, "Salaries under the 1921 Constitution," in ARTICLE IV,
CONSTITUTION (Louisiana State Law Institute, to be
published In Aug., 1954).
2 PROJET FOR A NEW
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The interest of conventions in salary fixing can be seen from
the changes made in the salaries of the Supreme Court Justices.
The Convention of 1812, for example, fixed the salaries of the
Supreme Court Justices at $5,000.98 The Convention of 1845
raised the salary of the Chief Justice $1000 and that of the Associate Justices $500. 99 The Convention of 1852 retained the salaries
without change. 10 0 In 1864 the Convention raised the Chief Justice to $7500 and the Associate Justices to $7000.101 These salaries were retained by the Convention of 1868.102 The Convention of 1879 reduced the salaries so that all Justices received
$5000.113 The Constitutions of 1898 and 1913 provided that these
salaries be not less than $5000.104 The Constitution of 1921
provided for salaries of $8000.1°5
A more serious limitation on the power of the legislature is
represented by the practice of making appropriations and levying
taxes by constitutional provision. Beginning with the Convention of 1845, constitution makers have been concerned with directing the appropriation of public funds to objectives approved by
the Convention. The Constitution of 1845 established a public
school fund to be held by the state as a loan; six percent of this
with rent from unsold lands was to be appropriated to the free
public schools and the provision concluded that "this appropriation shall remain inviolable.' 06 Another fund was provided for
a seminary of learning and the fear of the legislature was
expressed in the provision that "no law shall ever be made
diverting said fund to any other use than to the establishment
and improvement of said seminary of learning.' 10 7 In 1868 the
legislature was directed to levy a poll tax not to exceed $1.50 "for
98. LA. CONST. Art. 4, § 3 (1812).
99. LA. CONST. Art. 64 (1845).
100. LA. CONST. Art. 63 (1852).
101. LA. CONST. Art. 71 (1864).
102. LA. CONST. Art. 75 (1868).
103. LA. CONST. Art. 82 (1879).
104. LA. CONST. Art. 86 (1898); LA. CONST. Art. 86 (1913).
105. LA. CONST. Art. VII, § 6 (1921). The Times Picayune commented:
"One of the prime causes for the length of many of the ordinances is the

attempt of many of the state officers, departments, and boards to get themselves incorporated into the constitution, together with their salaries, so as
to get beyond the reach of the legislature." May 8, 1921, § 2, p. 17. Salaries in

the Constitution of 1921 are subject to change by a two-thirds vote of the
legislature. LA. CONST. Art. III, § 34 (1921). Salaries of judges are protected.
106. LA. CONST. Art. 135 (1845).

107. LA. CONST. Art. 136 (1845); Powell, A History of Louisiana's Constitutions c. 2, in 1 PROJET FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION (Louisiana State Law Institute,
to be published in Aug., 1954).
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school and charitable purposes 1 0 8 and the Constitution dedicated
one-half of the funds derived from the poll tax to the support of
the free public schools and the University of New Orleans. 10 9
The Constitution of 1879 recognized three separate educational funds and specified the debt of the state to each fund.110
Similar provisions were contained in the Constitution of 1898,
with additional sources of revenues dedicated."' The Constitution of 1898 also required appropriations for pensions for Confederate veterans of not less than $75,000 nor more than
$150,000.112

The Constitution of 1913 went one step further in the dedication of revenues by directly levying a special tax of one-fourth
mill for a road fund to construct and keep in repair state highways or public roads throughout the state, and the article vmas
declared to be self-operative. 1 13 A tax of three-fourths mill was
also levied by the Constitution for confederate pensions and the
1 4
provision was declared to be self-operative.
The Constitution of 1921 required a minimum appropriation
of $700,000 for the higher institutions of learning, excluding
Louisiana State University. 11 5 It continued the public school
fund, increasing its revenues. 116 For Louisiana State University,
in addition to the revenues from the seminary and the agricultural and mechanical college funds, the Constitution required the
appropriation of the proceeds of a one-half mill tax up to one
million dollars and the proceeds of the state severance tax for
two and one-half years up to five million dollars."' 7 The tax for
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

LA.
LA.
LA.
LA.
LA.

CONST.
CONST.
CONST.
CONST.
CONST.

Art. 118 (1868).
Art. 141 (1868).
Art. 233 (1879).
Arts. 254, 257, 258, 259 (1898).
Art. 303 (1898).

113. LA. CONST. Art. 291 (1913).

The Constitution also required an appro-

priation of not less than $1200 annually for the maintenance of a Civil War

Memorial Hall.
114. LA. CONST. Art. 303 (1913).

Amendments to the Constitution of 1913

changed the good roads tax to one-eighth mill and the Confederate veterans
pension tax to one-half mill. La. Acts 1918, No. 191, app. p. 11, adopted

Nov. 5, 1918. The Constitution was also amended to dedicate "at least onethird of the one mill" for the four institutions of higher learning. La. Acts
1918, No. 217, app. p. 14, adopted Nov. 5, 1918. At the same election voters
approved an amendment levying a one and one-half mill tax for the public
schools. La. Acts 1918, No. 226, app. p. 17, adopted Nov. 5, 1918.
115. LA. CONST. Art. XII, § 9 (1921).
116. LA. CONST. Art. XII, § 14 (1921).
117. LA. CONST. Art. XII, § 17 (1921).
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Confederate veterans pensions was continued." 8 The sources for
the highway fund were also increased." 9
From 1812, when the Constitution contained no dedications
of revenue, to 1921, impressive restrictions had been placed upon
the appropriation power of the legislature in the fields of public
education, highways and pensions.
Although all of Louisiana's constitutions have contained
statutory material, the Constitution of 1879 may be regarded the
first to establish the pattern of a long constitution. The Constitution of 1812 contained only 9 pages; that of 1845, 15 pages; that
of 1852, 14 pages; both the Constitutions of 1864 and 1868 contained 16 pages. The Constitution of 1879, with 35 pages, more
than doubled the size of the preceding constitution. Each of the
succeeding four constitutions has increased in length. The Constitution of 1898 was 57 pages, that of 1913, 67 pages, and that of
20
1921, approximately 81 pages.
As in the case with the prohibitions on the legislature, the
desire of the convention to prevent the recurrence of abuses of
a reconstruction legislature established a pattern which has been
2
followed by subsequent constitutions.' '
It is not surprising that the extent of the limitations on the
power of the legislature has given rise to the practice of including
authorizations to the legislature in the constitution. Authorizations in the 1921 Constitution include the power to merge or
consolidate executive and administrative offices whether created
in the constitution or otherwise, 122 to make provision for the
practice of forestry, 123 and to provide for drainage and reclama24
tion of marsh land.
118. LA. CONST. Art. XVIII, § 3(a) (1921).

119. LA. CONST. Art. VI, § 22 (1921). Vehicular license taxes, gasoline and
kerosene taxes.
120. Comparisons are based on the editions of the constitutions contained
in LA. CONST. ANN. (Dart, 1932). Amendments to the constitutions are not
included in the page count. The official edition of the 1921 Constitution as
adopted contains 127 pages, but it would represent approximately 81 pages
in Dart.
121. See Powell, A History of Louisiana's Constitutions c. 5, in 1 PROJET
FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION

(Louisiana State Law Institute, to be published in

Aug., 1954), for an extensive discussion of the legislative provisions of the
Constitution of 1879, including detailed provisions on sheriffs and coroners,
constables, clerks of court, and justices of the peace, tax provisions, including
collection and delinquency; an article on homestead exemptions in which
homesteads are defined in the Constitution.
122. LA. CONST. Art. III, § 32 (1921).
123. LA. CONST. Art. VI, § 2 (1921).
124. La. Const. Art. XV (1921). Other authorizations include the power to
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From this brief survey of the four types of constitutional
limitations imposed by conventions on legislative power in Louisiana, certain conclusions may be drawn: First, the development
in Louisiana reflects a mistrust of the legislature that has characterized most state constitutions, although the Louisiana development represents in many respects a more extreme type of
limitation. Second, although some of the limitations in the present Constitution can be traced back to 1812, the Constitution of
1879 has been far more influential in shaping the position of the
legislature in the present Constitution. The fact that this Constitution was drawn up to correct and prevent the abuses of the
carpetbag legislature is then of considerable significance. Third,
probably the most significant type of limitation of legislative
power has been that pertaining to the length and frequency of
its sessions. This limitation has tended to increase the power
of the Governor in relation to the legislature not only in respect
to the use of special sessions and the veto, but also in affecting
the general competence of the legislature tohandle the problems
before it. Fourth, probably the most serious failure of constitutional conventions in Louisiana has been the lack of concern
with measures to improve the competence of the legislature.
III
THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF

1921

An examination of the limitations on legislative power developed from 1812 through 1921 might easily create the impression
that the present day legislature is more limited in its exercise of
power than the legislature of 1812. However, two factors should
be considered in this connection. In the first place, governmental
power has expanded tremendously on all three levels of government since 1812 and the legislature has shared in this developgrant private rights of way for roads of necessity by general law (Art. III,

§ 37); to make laws limiting or prohibiting the cultivation of specified crops
in definite zones and providing the necessary funds to compensate for damages (Art. VI, § 14).

The legislature may authorize road districts to impose

additional taxes (Art. VI, § 19); it may rearrange judicial districts (Art. VII,
§ 34); abolish justice of the peace courts (Art. VII, § 51); provide assistant
district attorneys (Art. VII, § 60); vest in clerks of court authority to grant
such orders and do such acts as may be deemed necessary for the furtherance of the administration of justice (Art. VII, § 66); provide a method by
which absentee voting is permitted other than by mail (Art. VIII, § 22); provide a survey and maps of all real property in the subdivisions of the state
and that parishes and municipalities pay a portion of the cost not to exceed

60 per cent (Art. X, § 15); and authorize police juries to establish special
districts by general law (Art. XIV, § 14).
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ment. 125 In the second place, the Louisiana legislature in the 33
years since the adoption of the 1921 Constitution has proposed
347 amendments, of which the electorate has ratified 302, or 87
per cent. 126 The ease with which the Constitution is amended
raises the question of the real effectiveness of the limitations in
the 1921 Constitution discussed in Part II. To what extent have
the amendments to the Constitution been used to free the legislature from the restrictions imposed by the 1921 Convention?
An examination of the 302 amendments indicates that the
amending process has not been used to change the basic structure
of government so as to improve substantially the position of the
legislature. 27 For example, one of the most important limitations of the Constitution of 1921, that requiring the sixty-day
biennial session, has not been affected, nor have any modifications
128
been made in the Governor's veto power.
The important prohibitions on the exercise of legislative
power have not been removed. The use of the amending process
has made it relatively easy, however, for the legislature to provide exceptions to these prohibitions. One of the most important
limitations discussed in Part II was the prohibition against the
incurrence of debt. This prohibition still remains. 2 9 Yet at least
nineteen amendments have been added to the Constitution to
125. For an examination of this development, see WHITE, THE STATES AND
(1953).
126. See Table XIV-1, The LouisianaConstitution: Amendments Proposed
and Adopted: 1922-1952, in .3 PROJET FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION (Louisiana State
Law Institute, to be published in Aug., 1954).
127. For an analysis of constitutional amendments under the 1921 Constitution, see Owen, The Need for Constitutional Revision in Louisiana, 8 LouiSIANA LAW REVIEW 1, 58-63 (1947). For analyses of individual amendments see
reports of New Orleans Bureau of Governmental Research and for the 1952
THE NATION

amendments see also PUBLIC AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL, VOTERS GUIDE TO THE
AMENDMENTS (1952).

128. Of the twelve amendments to the legislative article, one was the
result of an unfavorable judicial decision on the milk commission (La. Acts
1940, No. 394, p. 1463), one repealed the prohibition against a legislator's
taking a position during the term for which he was elected which was
created or the emoluments thereof increased by the legislature while he was
a member (La. Acts 1936, No. 90, p. 269, adopted Nov. 3, 1936). A third
changed the deadline for the introduction of bills from the 30th to the 21st
day (La. Acts 1932, No. 145, p. 502, adopted Nov. 8, 1932). The other nine
concerned procedural matters. La. Acts 1952, No. 509, p. 1227, limited the
appropriation power of special sessions in the final months of a governor's
term of office.
129. See State ex rel. Porterie v. Charity Hospital, 182 La. 268, 161 So. 606
(1935), in which the court upheld the authority of the legislature to authorize
state agencies to incur debt without a constitutional amendment.
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authorize particular bond issues. 18 0 The result is that Louisiana
with a constitutional prohibition against the contracting of debt
has the tenth highest per capita debt of the forty-eight states.'l8
The Constitution of 1921 as adopted prohibited exemptions from
the property tax except as to the subjects listed in the Constitution. 132 The prohibition remains but the number of exemptions
88
'has been expanded by more than twenty-two amendments.'
The Constitution as adopted provided limitations on the
incurrence of debt by political subdivisions.8 4 This provision
has been amended thirty-one times.' 85
The Constitution contained a prohibition against the loaning
or granting of funds or things of value by a state or a political
137
corporation. 8 6 This has been amended five times. '
Probably the most significant use of the amending process
by the legislature has been in imposing further limitations on its
legislative power. It would appear that in many respects Louisiana legislatures have been as mistrustful of legislative power
as constitutional conventions have been. Each type of limitation
imposed by constitutional conventions on the legislature has also
been imposed by constitutional amendments initiated by the
legislature. This paradoxical situation is particularly well illustrated by the statutory material added by amendment to the
8
13
Constitution.
Two examples will illustrate this practice. Article VI-A of
the present Constitution was added by an amendment in 1930.
This amendment, which is self-operating, levies a one-cent gasoline tax and dedicates it to highways and ports. It covers twelve
pages of the Constitution. It actually is longer than an act of the
legislature levying a four-cent gasoline tax. 18 9 The dedication
of revenues by the Constitution of 1921 was discussed in Part II.
130. Amendments to the Constitution of 1921, in SPECIAL STUDIES, 1 PROJET
FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR LOUISIANA

(Louisiana State Law Institute, to be

published in Aug., 1954).

131. PUBLIC AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL, LEGISLATIVE BULLETIN No. 1, p. 2
(May 15, 1954).
132. LA. CONST. Art. X, § 4 (1921).
133. Amendments to the Constitution of 1921, supra note 130.
134. LA. CONST. Art. XIV, § 14 (1921).
135. Amendments to the Constitution of 1921, supra note 130.
136. LA. CONST. Art. IV, § 12 (1921).
137. Amendments to the Constitution of 1921, supra note 130.
138. The 302 amendments have tripled the length of the Constitution of
1921.
139. See Owen, The Need for Constitutional Revision in Louisiana,8 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW 59-63, app. IV (1947).
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Yet it was not the Constitutional Convention of 1921
cated forty per cent of the state's revenues to specific
but rather it has been the legislatures since that time
by constitutional amendment continued to restrict
4°
lature's power of appropriation.1
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A second example of the use of constitutional amendments
to limit the power of the legislature can be seen in the so-called
board bills of 1952 setting up the boards of highways, institutions,
welfare, and wild life and fisheries.' 41 There was no question of
the authority of the legislature to set up the boards in the manner provided for by the amendments. As a matter of fact, they
were provided for by legislation until the amendments were
approved by the electorate. Yet the power of future legislatures
to deal with these boards has now been limited by the constitu1 42
tional amendments.
Of course, the more frequently the Constitution is amended
and the greater the detail of the amendments, the more amendments will be required to keep the document up-to-date. Article
VI-A, referred to above, for example, has been amended nineteen
times. 1 4 Article VI on Administrative Officers and Boards has
been amended 29 times; 12 of these amendments have concerned
the general highway fund in Section 22.144
The abuse of the amending process of the constitution has
become the most frequently cited argument for a new constitution. Not only do the amendments submitted contain such a
mass of technical detail that the ordinary voter cannot understand them, but the number and complexity of the issues presented constitute an increasing danger that fundamental principles may be whittled away without either the legislature or the
people being aware of it. 1 4 5 The fact that only about one out of
140. Dedicated Revenues, in SPECIAL STUDIES, 1 PROJET FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR LOUISIANA

(Louisiana State Law Institute, to be published in

Aug.,

1954).
141. La. Acts 1952, No. 54, p. 161; La. Acts 1952, No. 48, p. 123; La. Acts
1952, No. 56, p. 170; La. Acts 1952, No. 57, p. 175.
142. For a discussion of these amendments
see PUBLIC AFFAIRS RESEARCH
COUNCIL, VOTERS GUIDE TO THE AMENDMENTS

16-23 (1952).

143. Amendments to the Constitution of 1921, supra note 130.
144. Ibid.
145. See, In this connection, Owen, The Need for ConstitutionaZ Revision
in Louisiana, 8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 1, 47-67 (1947); LOUISIANA LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL, CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION IN LOUISIANA 11-15 (1954); LEAGUE OF WOMEN
VOTERS, THE NEED FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION (1954); PUBLIC AFFAIRS RESEARCH
COUNCIL, LEGISLATIVE BULLETIN No. 6 (June 21, 1952); LOUISIANA BAR ASSOCIATION,

Do WE NEED A NEW CONSTITUTION? (April, 1954).
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three voters voted on any amendment in the 1952 general election
is indicative of the voters' reaction to an increasing burden of
146
constitutional amendments.
IV
THE NEXT CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION AND LEGISLATIVE POWER

Any attempt to explain the limitations placed upon the legislature by constitutional conventions and by constitutional amendments initiated by the legislature must consider two basic factors.
The first is the mistakes of the legislature, the abuses of power
which constitutional conventions, meeting frequently, felt able to
prevent in the future by constitutional prohibitions. This was
particularly true of the Convention of 1879. An equally important factor, however, has been the political factionalism of the
state beginning with the Whigs and Democrats in 1812, 1845, and
1852, the carpetbaggers and restorationists of the civil war and
reconstruction periods, and the two major factions of more recent
times. The constitutional convention or the constitutional amendments have been used to write a legislative program into the
constitution and thus protect it from change by future legislatures. The administration sponsored amendments in 1952 are
thus in the same tradition as the program of the Jacksonian
Democrats written into the Constitution of 1845 or the Whig program embodied in the Constitution of 1852.
Will a new constitutional convention carry over all of the
accumulated restrictions on legislative power of 130 years of
constitutional history and will the new constitution once adopted
be immediately amended in the tradition of the 1921 Constitution?
One new element that may have considerable effect upon
any future constitutional convention is the strengthening of the
legislative process begun by the 1952 legislative session. For the
first time in history serious efforts have been made by the Louisiana legislature to reorganize and improve the legislative process. The establishment of the Legislative Council, and its record
of accomplishment-which includes an extensive study of the
legislative process and dozens of special research studies-afford
evidence of a new spirit in the legislature. 147 The joint fiscal
146. PUBUC AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL, LOUISIANA VOTER PARTICIPATION IN
THE NOVEMBER 4, 1952 ELECTION (Jan. 20, 1953).
147. See, for example, LOUISIANA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE LOuISIANA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL TO THE LOUISIANA LEGISL ATURE (April 21, 1954). This
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committee and the thirteen informal study groups meeting between sessions are evidence of a new seriousness in the attack
on state problems.
The power of the legislature under the state's next constitution appears to depend, therefore, upon a number of factors:
(1) an increase in public confidence in the legislature; (2) a
willingness on the part of the next convention to eliminate many
limitations originally designed to prevent the abuses of a carpetbag legislature; and (3) a willingness on the part of the Governor,
legislators, and citizens to trust future legislatures with factional
programs rather than attempting to preserve these programs in
the Constitution.
In any event, the Louisiana courts have provided by their
consistent adherence to the doctrine of residual powers a safe
basis upon which the convention may work out its conception of
legislative power in a new constitution.
report contains the recommendations of the Council for strengthening the
legislative process.

